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NOTES
DENYING TAX EXEMPTION TO RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS: AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
INFRINGEMENT UPON RELIGIOUS
MEMBERSHIP PRACTICES*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the Internal Revenue Service has pro-
mulgated a series of regulations affecting the tax-exempt status' of
private and religious schools.2 Beginning in 1970, the Service an-
nounced that tax exemption could no longer be allowed to private
schools practicing racial discrimination.' When this policy was amplified
to include church-related schools,4 the religious community's response
was furious and unprecedented.'
* Copyright 1982.
1. 26 U.S.C. § 501 (1970 ed.); pertinent provisions of this section of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code are:
(a) Exemption from taxation.-an organization described in subsection
(c) shall be exempt from taxation . . .
(c) List of exempt organizations.-
(3) Corporations .... operated exclusively for religious . . . purposes.
Contributions to such organizations are also tax deductible under I.R.S. S 170, 26 U.S.C.
170 (1970 ed.):
(a) Allowance of deduction.
(1) General Rule. There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable
contribution ...
(c) Charitable contributions defined.-For purposes of this section, the
term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for
the use of-
(2) A corporation . . . -
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious . . . pur-
poses ...
2. See Rev. Rul. 71447, 1971-2 C.B. 230; Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834;
Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975 C.B. 158; Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975 C.B. 587.
3. Internal Revenue Service News Release, July 10, 1970, 7 STAND FED TAX
REP. (CCH) #6970 (1970).
4. Internal Revenue Service News Release, July 19, 1970, 7 STAND FED TAX
REP. (CCH) #__ (1970).
5. See Tax Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings on Proposed IRS Revenue
Procedure Affecting Tax Exemption of Private Schools Before the Subcommittee on Over-
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Throughout the ensuing controversy, the Service has cited as
its primary authority a United States District Court decision denying
tax exemptions to activities contrary to "public policy."' This court
reasoned that since "public policy" opposed racial discrimination, the
Internal Revenue Code must be construed and applied to deny tax-
exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools.7 This deci-
sion, however, expressly declined to consider any issues that involved
religious schools whose sincere religious beliefs mandated some form
of racial restrictions.
8
The religious schools, on the other hand, cite Supreme Court rul-
ings which affirm the constitutional right of religious organizations
to establish their own membership and disciplinary criteria.' In these
rulings, the courts have clearly and decisively held that the Constitu-
tion compels civil authorities to stay out of the internal affairs of
religious organizations,'" regardless of alleged due process or civil
rights violations.11 Only a compelling state interest sufficient to stop
the activity itself warrants a denial of tax exemption due to internal
sight of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979). The
national response to the application of the proposed procedures denying tax exemp-
tion to religious beliefs was overwhelming and unprecedented. The IRS received more
correspondence in oppsition to these procedures than for any single issue in IRS history.
Id. at 2.
6. Green v. Conally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curiam sub nom.,
Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1168-69; Judge Leventhal expressly stated that the court declined
to consider any issues pertaining to tax exemptions for religious schools: "We are
not now called upon to consider .. .whether tax-exempt .. . status may be available
to a religious school that practices acts of racial restriction because of the requirements
of the religion." Id. Because the IRS reversed its opposition to the plaintiff while the
case was on appeal and thus was not in a true adversary context when taken before
the Supreme Court, the Court later noted in Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S.
725 (1974): "The question of whether a segregative private school qualifies under S
501(c)(3) has not received plenary review of this Court. . . .The Court's affirmance
in Green lacks the precendential weight of a case involving a truly adversary con-
troversy." Id. at 740, n.11. The original plaintiffs have reopened the Green case and
brought a new companion suit against the IRS as well. But according to Congressman
Philip M. Crane, the entire history of the Green litigation has been collusive, non-
adversarial, and a deliberate "sweetheart" suit to contravene express Congressional
refusal to allow funding for the IRS procedure against private schools. See 127 CONG.
REC. H5394-96 (daily ed. July 30, 1981) (remarks of Rep. Crane); Green v. Tegan, Civ.
No. 1355-69 (D.D.C., reopened July 23, 1976); Wright v. Regan, Civ. No. 76-146 (D.D.C.,
filed July 30, 1976).
9. See, e.g., infra notes 55, 66 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 68-69, 88-89 and accompanying text.
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religious membership practices. Thus, the court would have to find
racial restrictions practiced by any religious group to be illegal before
it could interfere with those practices.12
In October, 1981, the United States Supreme Court agreed to
hear and decide two cases which involved religious schools. 3 These
cases promised to be the first plenary review of first amendment-
free exercise issues raised by the application of IRS revenue pro-
cedures to private religious schools." However, the Reagan Ad-
ministration, on the eve of Supreme Court oral argument, announced
that the IRS procedures were lacking in statutory authority and
ordered the tax exemptions of the schools involved to be reinstated. 5
This announcement was met by a fury of protest from civil rights
groups."6 As a result, President Reagan introduced legislation to Con-
gress which would authorize past IRS policies." Subsequently,
12. See infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
13. Bob Jones University v. Unied States, 468 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd,
639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S., Oct. 13, 1981);
Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977),
aff'd, No. 80-1473 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S., Oct. 13, 1981).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. "
15. Treasury Department News Release, January 8, 1972, 10 STAND. FED. TAX
REP. (CCH) #6301 (1982).
16. School Tax Exemption: White House Staff Blows IRS Case, Human Events,
January 30, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
17. H.R. 5313, S. 2024, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., January 25, 1982, CONG. REC.
H29 (1982). The pertinent parts are as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. DENIAL OF TAX EXEMPTIONS TO ORGANIZATIONS
MAINTAINING SCHOOLS WITH RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY
POLICIES.
Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to ex-
emption from tax) is amended . . . as follows:
(1) IN GENERAL.-An organization that normally maintains a
regular faculty and curriculum (other than an exclusively religious cur-
riculum) ... shall not be deemed to be described in subsection (c)(3), and
shall not be exempt from tax under subsection (a), if such organization
has a racially discriminatory policy.
(2) DEFINITIONS.- For the purposes of this subsection-
(i) An organization has a 'racially discriminatory policy' if it
refuses to admit students of all races to the rights, privileges, programs,
and activities generally accorded or made available to students by that
organization. . . . The term 'racially discriminatory policy' does not in-
clude an admissions policy of a school, or a program or religious training
or worship of a school, that is limited . . . to members of a particular
religious organizations or belief, provided, that no such policy, program,
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however, President Reagan again reversed his position and asked the
Supreme Court to hear the two religious schools' cases."8
Despite President Reagan's confused tactics, a significant legal
issue remains undecided. If the Court denies tax-exempt status to
religious organizations because of racially restrictive membership prac-
tices, the first amendment right of private sectarian schools to prac-
tice their religious beliefs will be substantially impaired.
This note reveals certain constitutional defects which result when
tax exemptions are denied to religious schools.19 An examination of
the constitutional rights of religious organizations is first.2" Next the
constitutionality of imposing certain conditions upon the receipt of
generally available government benefits is considered.21 This analysis,
in turn, demonstrates that if tax exemption is denied to private sec-
tarian schools because of racially restrictive religious practices, the
constitutional right to freely exercise religion will be substantially
impaired.22
preference or priority is based upon race or upon a belief that requires
discrimination on the basis of race.
SECTION 2. DENIAL OF DEDUCTIONS FOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO
ORGANIZATIONS MAINTAINING SCHOOLS WITH RACIALLY
DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES.
(a) Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 ... is amended
* . . as follows:
(7) DENIAL OF DEDUCTIONS FOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO
ORGANIZATIONS MAINTAINING SCHOOLS WITH RACIALLY
DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES.-No deduction shall be allowed under this
section for any contribution to or for the use of an organization described
in S 501(j)(1) that has a racially discriminatory policy as defined in S 501(j)(2).
18. New York Times, Feb. 25, 1982, at 12, col. 1.
19. The issues of the IRS statutory authority for the revenue procedures (see
supra note 2) and tax exemption as "state action" for purposes of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments and the Civil Rights Act are beyond the scope of this note. For
a discussion of these issues, see generally Note: Segregation Academies and State Action,
82 YALE L.J. 1436 (1973); Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionaliz-
ing" the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. (1972); Brown, State Action Analysis of
Tax Expenditures, 11 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 97 (1976); Neuberger & Crumplar, Tax
Exempt Religious Schools Under Attack: Conflicting Goals of Religious Freedom and Racial
Integration, 48 FORDHAM. L. REV. 229 (1979).
20. See infra notes 51-156 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 157-273 and accompanying text.
22. For purposes of this note, the general non-profit tax-exempt status pro-
vided by S 501(c)(3) (see supra note 1) will be considered as a non-preferential, general
benefit not otherwise violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
(see supra note 10) according to Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); see
also infra notes 347-51 and accompanying text.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 3 [1983], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss3/4
1983] RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS 441
FIRST AMENDMENT-FREE EXERCISE: "PREFERRED POSITION
Because first amendment freedoms of speech, press, and religion'
are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious''24 in our
society, any discussion which concerns action that may infringe upon
these rights must be undertaken with keen awareness of their pre-
ferred position in our constitutional system." The first amendment
has been heralded as the foundation of democracy,26 the "fixed star"
in our constitutional constellation,27 and the embodiment of freedoms
which are absolutely indispensable for preserving a free society."
Pluralism and diversity of opinion constitute the adhesive that
makes fast and preserves our free society. The idea that minority
opinion or expression may be penalized merely because it is offensive
or unorthodox "is hopelessly repugnant to the principles of freedom
upon which this Nation was founded."' On the contrary, the first
amendment was designed to secure the "widest possible dissemina-
tion of information from diverse and antagonistic sources"3 and to
"assure the unfettered interchange of ideas."31 Therefore, in spite of
the probability that excesses and abuses will occur,32 freedom of ex-
pression, being essential to enlightened opinion, must be protected
to the broadest scope possible in a liberty-loving society.33 In accor-
dance with this philosophy, freedom to believe and practice "strange
and, [perhaps], . . .foreign creeds"34 has classically been ranked one
of society's highest values.
Furthermore, the free exercise clause in particular has been
23. U.S. CONST. amend. I:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceable to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
24. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
25. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 155 (1943).
26. Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1428-29 (1974).
27. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
28. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 530 (1958) (Black J., concurring).
29. Id. In Speiser a California statute required the filing of a loyalty oath
as a prerequisite to qualification for tax-exempt status. The law also applied to churches.
30. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 48-49 quoting New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 266, 269 (1964).
31. Id.
32. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 196, 310 (1940).
33. Bridges v. State of Calif., 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
34. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 612 (1961).
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zealously regarded as a highly cherished freedom. As one commen-
tator noted: "of all the constitutional guarantees, the protection of
religious liberty has been the most exalted."3 The Framers of our
Constitution revered religious freedom as a basic element of civil
liberty with "transcendent value",3" requiring affirmative protection
from the pervasive power of government. In light of such considera-
tions, the religion clauses 38 were drafted to ensure religious freedom,39
not only for popular and accepted beliefs but for unpopular and minor-
ity beliefs as well.4" In religion as well as politics, "the tenets of one
man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor."4 It has been sug-
gested that this is why the Constitution does not define "religion."42
The definition of "religion" within the first amendment has been
subject to progressive judicial interpretation. 3 Today, however, the
35. See Boothby, Government Entanglement with Religion: What Degree of Proof
is Required?, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 613 (1980), citing P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 19 (1964).
36. Norwood v. Harrison, 513 U.S. 455, 469 (1973); School Dist. of Abington
Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213 (1963).
37. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971). The Court stated: "ITihe
history of many countries attests to the hazards of religion's intruding into the political
arena or of political power intruding into the legitimate and free exercise of religious
belief." See generally Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425-33 (1962); Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-13 (1947). According to Justice Black, "[t]oday most Americans
seem to have forgotten the ancient evils which forced their ancestors to flee to this
new country and to form a government stripped of old powers used to oppress them."
Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 865, 867 (1960).
38. See supra note 14.
39. School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222-23. See Pepper,
Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L.
REV. 309, 238 (1981).
40. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). "The law knows no heresy,
and is committed to the support of no dogma." Citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 679, 728 (1872). Id. at 86.
41. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. at 310.
42. See Note: The Hyde Amendment: An Infringement Upon the Free Exercise
Clause, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1054, 1059-60 n.40 (1981); see generally Comment, Toward
A Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1056 (1978); Comment, The
History and Utility of the Supreme Court's Present Definition of Religion,, 26 Loy. L.
REV. 87 (1989).
43. In early years of free exercise analysis, belief in a deity or Supreme Being
was considered essential. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1878). But later the courts relaxed this definition to
include nontheistic, Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961), and even conscien-
tious beliefs. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 445-47, 454 (1971); Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 180-83 (1965).
The Court has developed a test whereby it is determined whether an "individual's
beliefs are sincerely held, and in his own scheme of things, religious." See Note: The
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Supreme Court determines if a sincere religious belief is involved and,
if so, gives the practice of that belief protection as well." Although
a claim of religious belief must be given great weight, 5 the right of
religious practice is not absolute.4 '6 As any other right of expression,
free exercise of religion may be subject to restriction in order to pre-
vent grave and immediate dangers to society. 7 But the burden to show
such a danger is difficult for the government to bear; the courts have
zealously protected religious freedom in recent years, "sometimes at
the expense of other interests of admittedly high social importance. 48
Undoubtedly, eliminating all governmentally sponsored racial
discrimination 9 is of high social importance. But when the govern-
ment attempts to impose such restrictions on private institutions and
especially religious organizations, it infringes upon constitutional rights
that are of "supreme" and "transcendent" significance.' One of these
rights is the right of religious organizations to be the sole determiners
of membership and disciplinary practices as well as religious beliefs.
MEMBERSHIP AND DISCIPLINARY POLICIES
Under first amendment guarantees," a religious organization has
the right to be the sole determiner of its membership qualifications.
52
Hyde Amendment: An Infringement Upon the Free Exercise Clause, 33 RUTGERS L. REV.
at 1062. Finally, a content-free definition of religion developed, focusing on the sincerity
of the believer. See infra notes 168-79 and accompanying text; see generally United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185; United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 93-95. However,
the claim must still be "deeply rooted" in religious belief, not merely philosophical
or personal preference. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
44. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 631 (1968).
45. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163.
46. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. at 303.
47. Braunfeld v. Brown, 336 U.S. at 612.
48. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.
49. See Note, Racially Discriminatory Schools and the IRS, 33 TAx LAw, 571
(1980);
The equal protection clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments pro-
hibit the federal and state governments from participating in or encourag-
ing private racially discriminatory conduct. The issue with respect to
schools is whether by providing them tax benefits the federal govern-
ment has significantly involved itself with invidious discrimination in viola-
tion of the equal protection clause. The Supreme Court has drawn a distinc-
tion between government actions which provide direct aid or encourage-
ment to racial discrimination and more "generalized" actions that only
indirectly or insignificantly aid such discrimination.
Id. at 574-75.
50. See supra notes 23, 24, 35, 36 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 14, 23 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 55-71 and accompanying text.
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Such a statement seems axiomatic, and yet to deny tax exemption
for failure to comply with membership policies dictated by the IRS
would be to infringe upon and endanger this right.' As acknowledged
by the Supreme Court over one hundred years ago, the very nature
of a religious body mandates that membership and disciplinary policies
should be solely the function of church authorities. '
Churches
The peculiar and voluntary nature of a religious organization
demands that it dictate who may become and remain a member. In
Watson v. Jones,"5 the Court was asked to resolve an internal church
dispute over the control of church property." The Court found that
the nature of religious bodies precluded civil authorities from deciding
such ecclesiastical matters as internal policy, membership, or discipline
in the process of resolving property disputes. 7
The nature of a religious group was also found to be both volun-
tary and peculiar. Since the "law knows no heresy," it was determined
that individuals have the "full and free right to entertain any religious
belief' [and] "to practice any religious principle" which does not violate
the law. 58 In conjunction with this right was the corollary right to
organize "voluntary religious associations" to assist in the expression
and dissemination of the particular beliefs involved.5 9 These voluntary
associations were to be afforded full control over all matters of faith,
53. See, e.g., Wilson, Segregation Not the Only Issue, Vidette Messenger, Feb.
19, 1982, at 4, col. 1:
Are Mormons, who have had doubts about the eligibility of blacks and
other races for sainthood, to have their ... educational properties con-
structively confiscated? Are Orthodox Jewish schools to be taxed because
they ordinarily exclude Gentiles and females? The Roman Catholic Church
excludes women from its priesthood .... Does this violate the 14th Amend-
ment rights of women, thereby disqualifying parochial schools .. .until
such time as the church conforms to an absolutist view of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and ordains women? Are all Fundamentalist churches that
preach against racial admixture .. .to be taxed on the fair market value
of their properties? Isn't a tolerance of eccentricity indispensable to liberty?
Id.
54. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
55. Id.
56. Many of the early Supreme Court decisions involving religious organiza-
tions dealt with internal property disputes, often between a local church and the parent
organization. See id.; Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Gonzalez
v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
57. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728-29.
58. Id.; see supra notes 47, 48 and accompanying text.
59. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728-29.
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internal controversy, and ecclesiastical government, including member-
ship and discipline. 0 Therefore, a religious organization is a purely
voluntary group of individuals who have chosen to band together to
express their particular religious beliefs.
Because of this voluntary nature, no person has the "right" to
join a religious group unless approved by the group itself. Similarly,
due to the voluntary nature of religious groups and their diverse
beliefs, anyone who unites with such a body does so with implied con-
sent to submit to the qualifications, moral standards, and internal
decision-making body of that group. 1 Therefore, to claim that a per-
son has the "right" to join any given religious organization is con-
tradictory to the history, nature, and purposes of religious groups in
this country. 2
In 1952, the Supreme Court affirmed the principle of church
autonomy in membership practices. 3 The Court described the right
to decide internal ecclesiastical matters as radiating a "spirit of
freedom" and independence for religious organizations." Not only mat-
ters of faith and doctrine but matters of church government, including
membership, were declared free from state interference and
manipulation.65
Again in 1976, the Supreme Court not only affirmed these rul-
ings but held them to be constitutionally mandated. In Serbian Or-
thodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, a bishop, defrocked during the course
of a dispute over control of the diocese, brought suit to enjoin in-
terference with diocesan assets and to have himself declared "true"
diocesan bishop. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the bishop's
removal should be set aside because the proceedings against him were
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. See 40th Street and Fairmount Avenue Church of God v. Stover, 316
F. Supp. 374 (1970).
All who unite themselves to such a body [the geneal church] do so with
an implied consent to [its] government, and are found to submit to it.
But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion
of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions
could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed.
Id. at 376. Citing Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), accord Watson v. Jones, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 679.
63, Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
64. Id. at 116.
65. Id.
66. Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
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not in accordance with the church's constitution. But the United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding in part' that an individual's qualifica-
tions for membership in a particular group are the sole decision of
church authorities. 8 The Court said that even when affecting the civil
rights of members, decisions of church tribunals are to be accepted
as final and conclusive by secular courts. 9
Not only are courts to accept a religious organization's decisions
concerning membership as conclusive, but "constitutional concepts of
due process, involving secular notions of 'fundamental fairness,'" are
irrelevant to ecclesiastical matters."0 In fact, the first and fourteenth
amendments require that religious organizations be permitted to
establish their own rules governing membership, discipline, and
polity.71 Therefore, the courts have no authority to dictate who must
be admitted to a voluntary religious organization. Consequently, the
question arises as to whether religious schools should be afforded the
same protection as the Court has given to churches.
Church-Related Schools
Both the history of religious education and its treatment by the
Court reveal that sectarian schools are entitled to the same constitu-
tional protection as churches. Throughout history religious education
has been a major function, not only of the Judea-Christian tradition,
but of many other religions as well."2 The Supreme Court has recog-
nized this fact and has consistently regarded sectarian education as
a fundamental element of religious practice.73
Sectarian education has been characterized as "substantial
religious activity" and an "integral part of the religious mission" of
the sponsoring church.74 In Lemon v. Kurtzman,"5 a Rhode Island law
67. The Court also refused to grant petitioners' request to enjoin reorganization
by the Mother Church. The reorganization was also considered an ecclesiastical mat-
ter outside the jurisdiction of the Court. Id. at 720-24.
68. Id. at 711-12.
69. Id. citing Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
70. Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 715.
71. Id. at 724-25.
72. See Neuberger & Crumplar, Tax Exempt Religious Schools Under Attack:
Conflicting Goals of Religious Freedom and Racial Integration, 48 FORDHAM L. REV.
229, 259 (1979).
73. See NLRB v. Catholic Biship of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
74. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 609.
75. Id.
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authorized a fifteen percent salary supplement to be paid to teachers
in nonpublic schools. But the Court struck down the law, holding that
parochial schools were substantially religious in activity and purpose,
and, for that reason, government aid to these schools would violate
the religion clauses of the first amendment." The Court examined the
nature of the sectarian schools and found them indistinguishable from
their sponsoring churches. Characterizing sectarian schools as "power-
ful vehicle[s] for transmitting 77 the faith of their sponsoring churches,
the Court said the affirmative if not dominant purpose of such schools
was to inculcate religious values and assure future adherents to the
particular faith." Justice Douglas also noted the "admitted and ob-
vious fact that the raison d'etre of parochial schools is the propaga-
tion of religous faith. 79
Because its dominant purpose is propagating religious faith, sec-
tarian education cannot be separated from its religious mission. The
Court has said that such education "goes hand in hand with the
religious mission [which] is the only reason for the schools' existence.
Within the institution, the two are inextricably intertwined.""°
Similarly, teachers in sectarian schools have been described as com-
mitted to advancing this religious mission8 ' by assuring future
adherents to their particular faith.82
Religious schools have clearly and consistently been regarded as
substantial and integral parts of religious ministries.13 If a school is
too religious to receive government aid for purposes of the religion
clauses, may the government now say that the schools are not religious
enough for free exercise protection? Neither the first amendment nor
the Supreme Court has made any distinction between the religious
nature of a sectarian school and its sponsoring religious group. 4 Sec-
tarian schools, therefore, should be given the same constitutional pro-
76. Id. at 615-20.
77. Id. at 616.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 628 (Douglas J., concurring).
80. Id. at 657.
81. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. at 501.
82. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-86 (1971).
83. See supra note 73.
84. See supra notes 14, 74-83 and accompanying text.
85. See generally Fiedler v. Marumsko Christian School, 631 F.2d 1144 (4th
Cir. 1980); Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978); Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.
1974); 40th Street and Fairmount Avenue Church of God v. Stover, 316 F. Supp. 375
(E.D. Pa. 1970).
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tection as a church, even where racially restrictive membership prac-
tices are involved.
Application in Racial Contexts
In racial" as well as nonracial 8 contexts, courts have held that
no constitutional rights are abridged by exclusionary religious member-
ship practices.87 In 1970 a federal district court in Pennsylvania was
petitioned by a Black minister who was expelled from his local church
by the national body. 8 The plaintiff alleged that his dismissal was
predicated on his refusal to merge his "Black" church with "White"
churches for purposes of national governance. But the court dismissed
the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, stating that
whether religious policies are "conservative or liberal, racially restric-
tive or interracial", civil authorities cannot adjudicate their orthodoxy
nor give relief to a disgruntled complainant. The voluntary and unique
nature of religious organizations, as well as the first amendment,
preclude judicial interference with private religious denominational
practices. The central issue in this action was who was entitled to
membership in, and use of, the religious organization's facilities." The
Court ruled that it was an ecclesiastical matter solely for the religious
body's determination, and that the courts had no jurisdiction over such
matters.
Similarly, a federal court of appeals also refused to interfere with
internal religious membership practices where racial discrimination
was alleged.2 Invoking jurisdiction under section 1981 of the Civil
Rights Act of 19641 and the Constitution generally, the plaintiff alleged
that he was dismissed from the church because of his views on race
and the color of his wife's skin.' Affirming summary judgment against
the plaintiff, the court characterized the suit as an attempt to cor-
rode the free exercise of religion 5 with an "overlay of civil rights
86. See Nunn v. Black, 506 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Va. 1970).
87. Id.; Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490; 40th Street Church
of God v. Stover, 316 F. Supp. 375.
88. See 40th Street Chruch of God v. Stover, 316 F. Supp. 375.
89. Id. at 376.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490.
93. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 1981 reads in part: "All persons . . .
shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by
white citizens. .. ."
94. Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d at 493.
95. Id. In Simpson the court stated: "Now, the church is a sanctuary, if one
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legislation and other parts of the Constitution."9 This dispute was
viewed as purely ecclesiastical, and for the resolution of such disputes,
"the people of the United States conveyed no power to Congress to
vest its courts with jurisdiction."97 It is clear the this court considered
religious membership policies under exclusive control of the respec-
tive organization, and that the fourteenth amendment and Civil Rights
Act were irrelevant.
The court also found that ecclesiastical matters were not limited
to differences in church doctrine, but included social policy as well.98
This holding was consistent with an earlier opinion by the same court
which said that "social policy" was within the range of ecclesiastical
matters.99 A voluntary religious organization is certainly a social group
and, therefore, of necessity must make decisions based on its religious
social policy.
Finally, the court ruled that only a compelling state interest could
warrant such an intrusion into this protected area,' ° and that racial
restrictions were not one of the "gravest abuses, endangering para-
mount interests" which allowed judicial interference with religious
organizations.'' Similarly, no "grave danger" to the safety, peace or
order of society is imposed by a few minority religious groups who
believe in and practice some form of racial restrictions."2 A few courts,
however, have ventured into this realm of purely ecclesiastical
cognizance and have come to varying conclusions.0 3
When a religious organization's governing authorities claim that
its actions are mandated by sincere religious beliefs, the courts must
accept this decision as conclusive of the sincerety and religious nature
of that belief.' But not all courts have followed this ruling. In Brown
exists anywhere, immune from the rule or subject to the authority of the civil courts,
either state or federal, by virtue of the First Amendment." Id.
96. Id. at 492.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 493.
99. See Northside Bible Church v. Goodson, 387 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1967).
100. Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d at 493, citing Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205; Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145.
101. Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d at 494.
102. See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
103. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 639 F.2d 147; Goldsboro Chris-
tian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314, Fiedler v. Marumsko Christian
School, 631 F.2d 1144; Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310.
104. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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v. Dade Christian Schools,"5 a Black family attempted to enroll its
children in a church-related school with religiously-based racial restric-
tions. When admission was denied, the family brought an action under
section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act. i"' On appeal the Fifth Circuit
affirmed a trial court finding that the racial restriction was merely
institutional "policy" and not sincere religious belief protected by the
Constitution. 7 By characterizing the belief as nonreligious, the school's
opportunity to mount a free exercise defense was barred at the
threshold.10 8 Consequently, this decision has been subject to much
criticism.109
Generally, two fundamental errors appear in Brown. First, the
court apparently ignored the "content-free' sincerity test formulated
by the Supreme Court for Free Exercise cases." When the proper
governing authorities of a sectarian school respond that their actions
are mandated by sincere religious belief, the court must accept that
response by the governing church authorities as conclusive of the
sincerity and religious nature of that belief."' When a court under-
takes to examine the validity of religious beliefs, not only may the
conclusions which are reached infringe upon first amendment free ex-
ercise rights but so may the very process of inquiry itself. " Since
Dade Christian Schools unquestionably believed the Bible to forbid
interracial socialization and marriage," 3 the court should have
acknowledged this dispute as purely ecclesiastical in nature as man-
dated by the Supreme Court."'
The second error made by the Brown court was its conclusion
that Dade Christian School's racial restrictions were not religious
beliefs but institutional policy, because the church members "voted"
105. Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d at 311.
106. See supra note 93.
107. Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d at 311.
108. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163. In Seeger the court said that
while the "truth" of a belief is not open to question, there remains the significant
question whether it is "truly held." "This is the threshold question of sincerity which
must be resolved" before a free exercise defense will be accepted. Id. at 185; see generally
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
109. See Note, A Sectarian School Asserts Its Religious Beliefs: Have the Court
Narrowed the Constitutional Right to Free Exercise of Religion?, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV.
709 (1978).
110. See supra note 94 and infra notes 168-79 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
112. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490.
113. See supra note 109 at 715.
114. Id. at 716-17; see supra notes 55-71 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 17
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 3 [1983], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss3/4
1983] RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS 451
for those restrictions. "5 Since the Supreme Court has unquestionably
accepted dictates from a hierarchical church as matters of faith,"6 the
vote of a congregationalist church on a matter of doctrine must also
be accepted as a matter of faith. Whereas in a hierarchical church
the dictates come from a sole authority figure, in an independent con-
gregationalist church, the members themselves have full control and
authority over all matters of ecclesiastical concern." 7 Especially in the
area of doctrinally restrictive membership practices, the members of
the religious body must have full control, because they have banded
together specifically to espouse those particular doctrinal beliefs.
By labeling Dade Christian's beliefs as mere policy,"8 however,
the Brown court avoided the constraints upon interfering with inter-
nal church affairs announced by the Supreme Court only one year
earlier."9 Only a finding of "compelling" state interest could warrant
such an intrusion.' Since no free exercise defense was, in effect,
allowed in Brown, the court was not forced to find a compelling state
interest and, therefore, successfully but erroneously infringed upon
the membership practices of this religious school.
Internal disciplinary decisions are also a matter of purely ec-
clesiastical concern which preclude governmental or judicial
interference.' However, in Fiedler v. Marumsko Christian School, the
Fouth Circuit also failed to follow the proper analysis dictated by prior
Supreme Court rulings. 2' In that case Marumsko Baptist Church
operated a Christian school which had a rule prohibiting interracial
dating and marriage, though students were admitted without regard
to race."13 When a White student was expelled for dating outside her
race, she brought suit and was awarded damages."
This court, however, also failed to follow the rulings announced
115. Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d at 312.
116. See Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696.
117. Congregational churches are defined as local autonomous congregations
having full control and final authority over chuch matter. Therefore, the vote of a
congregation on matters of faith should be given equal weight as the decree of a cen-
tral figure in a hierarchical structured church. See generally Brown v. Dade Christian
Schools, 556 F.2d at 317 (Goldberg, Jr., concurring).
118. See supra notes 107, 115 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
120. See supra nbtes 47, 48 and 245-51 infra and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 66-69, 92-97 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 51-71, 108 and accompanying text.
123. Fiedler v. Marumsko Christian Schools, 631 F.2d at 1146-47.
124. Id.
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in Serbian Orthodox."' That decision expressly ruled that civil courts
have no jurisdiction over matters of church discipline or the conform-
ity of members to the standards of morality required of them." Under
these guidelines the decision of the church governor (here the Pastor-
Principal) should have been accepted as conclusive notwithstanding
any allegations of civil rights violations. Thus, the threshold test
of sincere religious belief would have been met, and only a compelling
state interest could have overridden the free exercise right.
Instead, the Fiedler court strictly scrutinized the church's and
Pastor's beliefs and concluded that the beliefs "appear[ed] to be based
on social and political rather than religious grounds.""' Since no valid
religious belief was present, the court concluded that it did not need
to apply a balancing of interests to see if a compelling state interest
existed." In light of the Serbian Orthodox decision and others,30 this
was clear error. The internal disciplinary practices of a religious
organization cannot be infringed upon unless a compelling state in-
terest is present, and racially restrictive practices have not been held
to be of such a compelling nature.1 3 1
One court, however, has held that public policy against racial
discrimination is a compelling state interest sufficient to outweigh the
free exercise of religion. In Bob Jones University v. United States,33
the Fourth Circuit held that "public policy" against racial discrimina-
tion in education was a sufficient compelling state interest to deny
tax exemption over a free exercise claim. 33 The IRS revoked Bob
Jones' tax exemption due to the University's religious belief forbid-
ding interracial dating and marriage," even though students from all
races were admitted and treated on an equal basis. 3' When Bob Jones
brough suit against the IRS,'13 the district court held that revoking
125. See supra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
126. Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 714.
127. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
128. Fiedler v. Marumsko Christian School, 631 F.2d 1152, n.12.
129. Id. at 1154.
130. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text; see generally Serbian Or-
thodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
131. See supra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
132. Bob Jones University v. United States, 639 F.2d 147.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 149.
135. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 895.
136. Back of this litigation lies Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725
(1974), wherein the Court held that the Anti-Injunction Act (26 U.S.C. 5 7421(a)) pro-
hibited the university from obtaining judicial review, through an injunction action,
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the University's tax exemption was an unconstitutional infringement
of their free exercise rights.3' Both the district and appellate courts
found the University's beliefs genuine religious convictions, yet after
balancing the interests the courts came to opposite conclusions. 3 '
Upon closer examination, at least two possible reasons for this
differences appear. First, the district court considered the University's
dating and marriage rules as the actual practice of their religious
beliefs"9 and not mere policy to make practicing some other beliefs
more convenient. 4W Therefore, to penalize Bob Jones for these prac-
tices would be a severe and undue burden on its free exercise rights.
Since the court found no compelling state interest in prohibiting racial
discrimination by religious organizations, the free exercise right
prevailed."
The appellate court, on the other hand, found no significant
burden on religious exercise.'43 The court stated that abandonment
of the University's policies would not prevent teaching the Scriptural
doctrine of nonmiscegenation, and therefore the burden, if any, was
insignificant. This argument, however, was nothing more than the
belief-action dichotomy rejected by the Supreme Court decades
earlier.'45 To deny protection to religious practice is to deny the clear
connotation of the term "exercise".' This separation of belief from
practice was rejected as contrary to the express written rule of "ex-
ercise" and as relegating the clause to mere surplusage. 147 A religious
practice, especially when so closely integrated with its corresponding
belief, must be given full free exercise protection.
By gliding over the burden on religion in this manner, the court
failed to give exacting scrutiny to this factor in the balancing test.48
of revocation by IRS of the University's tax-exempt status. The Court suggested that
a proper procedure for the university to gain judicial review would be to pay "...
an installment of FICA and FUTA taxes, exhaust the Service's internal refund pro-
cedures, and then bring suit for the refund." Id. at 746. See Bob Jones University
v. United States, 639 F.2d 147.
137. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 468 F. Supp. at 897.
138. Id. at 898-900, 639 F.2d at 149, 153-54.
139. 468 F. Supp. at 898.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 898-99.
143. Bob Jones University v. United States, 639 F.2d at 153-54.
144. Id.
145. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 322 U.S. 78.
146. See Pepper, supra note 39, at 310.
147. See PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 31 (1975).
148. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205; in Yoder the Court said that even
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Neither did the court consider any less restrictive alternatives, as
required by the Supreme Court, such as a religious exemption. " 9 In-
stead the compelling state interest, "public policy," was given exclusive
attention, and that was based primarily on the presumption that Bob
Jones was an educational institution." This characterization, and the
weight given it, appears to be erroneous in light of the Supreme
Court's treatment of sectarian schools.15'
In summary, the voluntary and unique nature of religious
organizations demand that such groups have sole control over member-
ship criteria. 2 No religious group can be forced to accept someone
whom the members, in accordance with their particular beliefs, do
not approve. If a sect desires to limit itself to those who are "born
again," baptized in a particular fashion, or even those of a certain
ethnic or racial background, it has the constitutional right to do so.'5
However, by threatening the loss of tax exemption for not complying
with the government's idea of proper membership policies, religious
groups are being coerced into adopting "approved" membership
criteria. This is a direct violation of the establishment clause,1" and
destroys the religious and voluntary nature of sectarian bodies.
Similarly, to penalize religious minorities who do not conform to "ap-
the highest ranked state's interests are not free from a balancing process when they
impinge on fundamental rights. The Yoder Court then went on and scrutinized the
nature, validity and extent of the burden on the petitioner's free exercise right. Id.
at 214-19.
149. See infra notes 251-60 and accompanying text.
150. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 639 F.2d at 149-55.
151. See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 55-71 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 51-71 and accompanying text; see generally Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). In Zorach the Court said that it was the right of every
sect to "flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and appeal of its dogma." Id.
at 313. To deny the right of voluntary religious groups to choose whom they will
fellowship with is to destroy this very concept.
154. See supra note 14; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, etablished a three-
prong test for Establishment Clause claims: 1) The regulation must mave a secular
purpose, 2) the primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion, and 3) the
regulation must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. "The
objective-is to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either into the precincts
of the other." Id. at 614; the denial of tax exemption based solely on differences in
religious beliefs and practices has the effect of inhibiting those religions with "unap-
proved" beliefs and practices. "Neither a state nor the Federal Government ...can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); see also Pepper, supra note 39,
at 314.
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proved" government policies,'55 contradicts the principles of pluralism,
diversity, and equal protection that this society uniquely cherishes.'"
CONDITIONING BENEFITS ON FOREGOING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The constitutional right of religious organizations to control their
own membership'57 is of particular importance when government at-
tempts to condition a generally available benefit upon relinquishing
that right. Just as a direct tax upon religious exercise would unques-
tionably be unconstitutional, the taxing power can also be used in-
directly to limit the exercise of first amendment rights.158 Several
Supreme Court decisions have held unconstitutional various conditions
imposed upon the receipt of generally available government benefits.'59
In accordance with these decisions, the conditioning of tax exemption
on foregoing constitutionally-protected religious membership practices
is clearly unconstitutional.
As recently as 1981,"' the Court reaffirmed that government ac-
tion need not purposely infringe upon religious practice to violate the
religion clauses. 6' The effect of government action alone may be ade-
quate to render it invalid as an undue burden on free exercise rights.2
Consequently, a four-part test has been developed whereby govern-
ment action can be examined when challenged on free exercise
grounds.6 3
155. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205. The Yoder Court said "there can
be no assumption that today's majority is 'right' and the Amish and other like them
are 'wrong'." "Even their idiosyncratic separateness exemplifies the diversity we pro-
fess to admire." Id. at 223, 226.
156. Id.; see Pepper, supra note 39, at 311. This commentator stated that our
society is a "society of disparte social and cultural groups .... that positively values
cultural pluralism." Id.
157. See supra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
158. See Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U.S. 232 (1936).
159. Id.; see Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398; Braunfeld v. Brown, 336 U.S. 599; Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
160. See Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 101 S. Ct. 1425.
161. Id. The Court made clear that "a regulation neutral on its face may, in
its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirements for governmental
neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion." Id. at __, 101 S. Ct.
at 1431, citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220; cf. Walz v. Tax Commissioner,
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
162. See Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. at - 101 S. Ct. at 1431-32; Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 403.
163. See Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707; see generally Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398.
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First, the Court determines if religious exercise is involved'" and,
second whether a burden upon that exercise exists.16 Third, if a
burden does exist, the state must show a compelling interest suffi-
cient to outweigh the free exercise rights. 6' Finally, even if a com-
pelling state interest does exist, the state must demonstrate that no
less restrictive alternatives are available to achieve that interest, in-
cluding the possibility of a religious exemption.'67 The free exercise
claimant, however, must establish that sincere religious practice is
involved.
Religious Belief or Activity
When considering whether the asserted conduct is "religious"
for purposes of a free exercise defense, the Court looks to both the
religious nature of the belieff and the sincerity with which it is held. 9
The belief must be "rooted in religion" to merit first amendment
protection.7 ' "A way of life, however virtuous and admirable", does
not qualify if it is "based upon purely secular considerations.' 7 ' Since
the merits, validity, or legitimacy of a belief cannot be considered, 7 '
the determination of its religious nature is a "difficult and delicate
task". 73 The resolution is a question of fact to be determined in each
particular case.' 4
There are numerous factors relevant to this determination. They
include the pervasiveness of the beliefs in daily life,"" the demands
they make upon the believer,'76 and whether the beliefs are mandated
by some external authority, not merely by personal preference.' 7 If
164. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. at __, 101 S. Ct. at 1430.
165. Id. at _ 101 S. Ct. at 1431-32.
166. Id. at _ 101 S. Ct. at 1432.
167. Id. at _ 101 S. Ct. at 1432-33.
168. Id. at , 101 S. Ct. at 1430.
169. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1965); United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. at 84-87; see also Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 101 S. Ct.
at 1425; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
170. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. at __, 101 S. Ct. at 1430.
171. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216; the Court indicated that beliefs such
as Thoreau's were merely subjective rejection of social values: "Thoreau's choice was
philosophic and personal rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to the
demands of the Religion Clauses." Id.
172. See Drake, Attempted State Control of the Religious School, 7 OHIo N.U.L.
REV. 954, 956 (1980).
173. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. - , 101 S. Ct. at 1430.
174. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185.
175. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 109-12.
176. Id. at 216-17.
177. Id.
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the beliefs qualify as "religious," then the sincerity of the believer
may be considered.
Generally, the same factors used in determining the religious
nature of a belief will determine whether the belief is sincerely held.
As this, too, is a question of fact,1 78 the court will examine all rele-
vant evidence to determine if a person adheres to professed beliefs.
Even an individual who is "struggling" with, or cannot clearly and
precisely articulate his beliefs, has received first amendment
protection.179 The factors which determine the sincerety of religious
beliefs can be applied to groups (such as religious schools) as well
as individuals.
Without question, the courts have held that church-related educa-
tion is a deeply-rooted religious practice.1 ° Sectarian schools are essen-
tial in many cases to the propagation and perpetuation of a particular
faith."s' The fact that religious groups have made substantial sacrifices
and contributions to advance their faith in this manner substantiates
their sincerity.82 The zealousness with which they regard their beliefs
is also proof of sincerity. For example, various religious organizations
today are engaging in substantial and costly litigation to defend
religious beliefs that involve racial distinctions. '83
Although contemporary religious beliefs that involve racial
distinctions may not be popular, they are, nevertheless, entitled to
full constitutional protection if they are sincerely held. The fact that
such beliefs are repugnant to the government is immaterial to their
constitutional protection." u In fact the Supreme Court has recently
said:
178. See supra note 174.
179. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. at __, 101 S. Ct. at 1430.
180. See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
181. Id.
182. See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602. The Lemon Court
acknowledged that the contribution of church-related schools in our National Life has
been enormous. Id. at 625; Public education in the colonies was virtually non-existent
and generally was carried on by denominational activity. At that time government
looked to the church to provide education. Tax exemption of these schools has received
undeviating acceptance from our earliest days as a Nation. Id. at 645; "Taxpayers. have
been spared vast sums of money by the maintenance of these educational institutions
by religious organizations, largely by the gifts of faithful adherents." Id. at 625. Denying
tax exemption to such a school would coerce these faithful adherents to give only
to "approved" religious schools, thereby indirectly destroying these minority institu-
tions considered "offensive" to public policy.
183. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
184. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. at __, 101 S. Ct. at 1430.
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Like a sectarian school, a private school -even one that dis-
criminates-fulfills an important educational function ...
Such private bias is not barred by the Constitution, nor does
it invoke any sanction of laws .. ."I
If non-sectarian private schools are free under the Constitution to
discriminate, 6 certainly religious schools with the additional "pre-
ferred" right of free exercise are entitled to maintain and practice
sincere religious beliefs no matter how racially restrictive. To deny
tax exemption solely because of racially restrictive membership prac-
tices would be a crippling burden on religious freedom.
Burden on Free Exercise
If a finding of sincere religious practice is made, the next deter-
mination is whether a burden on that practice exists."7 Undoubtedly,
revoking a religious organization's tax exemption would substantially
burden, if not destroy, that organization. As a matter of economic
reality in America today, tax exemption can mean life or death to
churches and their educational ministries.' The loss of tax-exempt
status results in affirmative and substantial tax liability, not merely
the foregoing of a benefit. Thus, the coercive pressure to modify beliefs
and practices "to confrom to the prevailing officially-approved religion
is plain."'8 8 This type of coercive pressure has been held to be an un-
due burden on religious exercise."'
Conditions on General Benefits as a Burden on Religion
A condition imposed upon a generally available government
benefit that coerces a person to alter or forego religious practices
has been held to be an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise
of religion. In Thomas v. Review Board,'' the Court focused on the
coercive impact of denying unemployment benefits to a Jehovah's
Witness who terminated his job due to religious convictions. The peti-
tioner, Thomas, while employed at a foundry and machine company,
was transferred to a department producing military tank turrets.
185. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973).
186. Id.; but see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (private schools operated
on a commercial basis cannot discriminate) (emphasis added).
187. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
188. See Pfeffer, supra note 147, at 74.
189. School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 221.
190. See Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 101 S. Ct. 1425; Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398.
191. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. __, 101 S. Ct. at 1430.
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When a transfer was denied, he quit, stating that his religious beliefs
prevented him from working on weapons. Subsequently, when he ap-
plied for unemployment compensation, he was declared ineligible
because he left work without good cause. The Supreme Court of In-
diana affirmed this ruling, but the United States Supreme Court
reversed, finding that denying the benefits was an unconstitutional
burden on Thomas' free exercise rights.19
While examining the burden on free exercise, particular emphasis
was given to the coercive impact of denying the benefits. The em-
phasis focused on the "choice" put to Thomas and the resulting coer-
cive pressure to forego his religious beliefs in order to qualify for
the benefits.'93 Citing earlier holdings that "a person may not be com-
pelled to choose between the exercise of a First Amendment right
and participation in an otherwise public program,"'9 the Court found
that the choice put to Thomas was identical.' 9' Thomas had to choose
between abandoning his belief to retain work, or foregoing unemploy-
ment benefits to remain true to this religious convictions. Inherent
in any such "choice", especially when precipitated solely by religious
practices, is the unmistakable pressure to forego that practice. This
coercive pressure to modify behavior (and thereby violate religious
beliefs) was found to be an undue burden on religion.'"
The denial of tax exemption to religious schools for nonconform-
ing racial practices carries with it a devastating burden and un-
mistakable pressure to abandon sincere religious beliefs. The IRS con-
tends that religious schools are not forced to choose between their
beliefs and the benefit of tax exemption." For example, a school which
has beliefs prohibiting interracial marriage could abandon their dating
and marriage rules and still continue to teach the doctrine of non-
miscegenation.' But this argument is contrary to the test of sinceri-
ty used to determine true religious belief."' When the court examines
a religious belief for sincerity, a key factor is the demonstration of
that belief in everyday life.2'0 Where the practice is found to be close-
192. Id. at -' 101 S. Ct. at 1433.
193. Id. at __, 101 S. Ct. at 1431-32.
194. Id. at -' 101 S. Ct. at 1431.
195. Id. at -' 101 S. Ct. at 1432.
196. "While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free ex-
ercise is nonetheless substantial." Id.
197. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 14, Bob Jones University v. United States,
639 F.2d 147.
198. Id.
199. See supra notes 168-79 and accompanying text.
200. Id.
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ly integrated with the belief itself, that practice must be protected
as well. Therefore, when a religious group holds the doctrine of non-
miscegenation, the practice of that doctrine, because it is so closely
integrated with the belief, must also be protected. To deny this prac-
tice would severely burden if not destroy the belief itself.0 '
Similarly, to allow dissenters or "unbelievers" into a religious
fellowship would disrupt and destroy the very purpose for which it
was formed. 2 As a result, sectarian minorities are given the "choice"
of either forsaking peculiar religious beliefs and conforming to
government-approved orthodoxy, or incurring a devastating penalty
in the form of substantial tax liability. To condition first amendment
rights upon the financial ability to enjoy them is, perhaps, the most
repugnant form of coercion."
Use of Taxing Power to Burden Religion
The coercive pressures and burdens on religion are also present
where failure to modify or forego protected practices results in affir-
mative tax expenditures. Both direct taxes on religious exercise and
the conditioning of tax exemption on foregoing first amendment ex-
pression have been condemned by the Supreme Court. In Murdock
v. Pennsylvania,2 "' an ordinance requiring religious colporteurs 5 to
pay a license tax prior to disseminating their religious literature was
201. The Supreme Court began its interpretation of the free exercise clause
by holding that only religious belief, not practice was protected. Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Later this simple belief-action dichotomy was rejected as
contrary to the express written rule of "exercise" and as relegating the clause to
mere surplausage. Religious acts were now protected but only to the extent that regula-
tions were not "unduly" restrictive. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940);
see also PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 31 (1975). However, Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) brought religious action as well as belief under the strictest
limits of constitutional protection. Only under extraordinary circumstances where a
compelling state interest could be shown would interference with religiously motivated
action be allowed. "It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to
some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area,
'[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for per-
missible limitation.'" Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
In sum, the Supreme Court has said that if the claim is found to be sincere religious
belief, the practice of that belief is protected as well. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618,
631 (1978).
202. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
203. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 49.
204. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
205. A "colporteur" is a traveling vendor of religious books. RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY 181 (1980).
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held invalid. First, after examining the nature of the activity involved,
the Court recognized hand distribution of religious tracts as "an age-
old form of missionary evangelism,""' noting its "potent force" and
large scale use by religious movements throughout history. As such,
it was entitled to the same protection as worship in churches or
preaching from pulpits."7 Finding no question of unlawful activity, the
sole issue concerned the constitutionality of conditioning religious ac-
tivity upon payment of a tax."8
Similarly, religious schools today that are deemed to be violating
public policy are faced with the same prospect: they must change their
practices or pay taxes. In analogy to Murdock, the propagation of
religious faith through the medium of sectarian education is also an
"age-old" form of evangelism. On numerous occasions this has been
recognized, and church-related schools have received full first amend-
ment protection.!9 Neither has any court determined that unlawful
conduct is involved when religious schools limit enrollment to students
of their particular religious faith. Religious schools are not barred from
restricting their students to those of a particular creed, even if based
on racial discrimination.210 As in Murdock, the issue is whether govern-
ment can condition this lawful religious activity on payment of taxes.
This is not to say that religious organizations are necessarily
free from all financial burdens of government. If a sectarian group
is using "ordinary commercial methods ... to raise propaganda funds,"
the state may properly charge a reasonable fee for such activity."'
However, the mere fact that religious education, like religious
literature, is "sold" rather than "donated" does not transform that
ministry into a commercial enterprise. 2 Characterizing sectarian
schools as "selling" education would be a distortion of their religious
mission. A religious school, as any school, needs funds to maintain
its existence. The charging of tuition is merely "incidental and col-
lateral" to the primary function of propagating religious faith.1 3 In
order to incur any type of license tax, an activity would have to be
purely commercial.214
206. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. at 108.
207. Id. at 109.
208. Id. at 110.
209. See supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
211. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. at 110; quoting Jones v. Opelika, 316
U.S. 584 (1942).
212. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. at 111.
213. Id. at 112.
214. Id. at 110.
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Property and income taxes on religious organizations while per-
missible must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner. 15 The Mur-
dock court was dealing with a flat tax upon religious activity, and
condemned it as a fee paid for exercising a privilege granted by the
Bill of Rights. Though the state may not impose such a tax upon the
enjoyment of a constitutional right, it may possibly tax property and
income derived from the activity."' But the application of such taxes
must not discriminate between religious groups. Though income and
property taxes, equally applied, may not result in the same evils of
censorship, control, and prior restraint as a flat tax might, they may
have these effects when applied in a discriminatory manner.
Discriminatory denial of tax exemption has been found to burden,
suppress, and penalize protected first amendment expression. In
Speiser v. Randall,21 a California statute required filing a loyalty oath
as a prerequisite to qualifying for tax exemption.219 The exercise of
taxing power in this manner was found to discriminate against pro-
tected expression and effectively limit first amendment freedoms. By
denying tax exemption to those engaging in protected forms of speech,
this statute had the effect of suppressing and penalizing that speech.'
The Court said the denial of tax exemption applied substantial coer-
cive pressure to compel the applicant to refrain from otherwise pro-
tected activity. For this reason, tax exemption could not be denied
unless the activity itself was found to be punishable by fine or
imprisonment."' Since the state could deny tax exemption where
unlawful activity was proven, this part of the law was allowed to stand.
But the procedures used to determine who was engaging in unlawful
expression were struck down as violating due process. 2
The above mentioned "procedures" were struck down because
they laid the burden of proof upon the persons applying for tax-exempt
status. Under the California law, churches and religious organizations
were also among this group of applicants. Throughout the entire pro-
215. Id. at 113.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513.
219. Id. Under California law any applicant for tax exemption, including a church,
was required to sign a loyalty oath stating: "I do not advocate the overthrow of the
government of the United States or of the State of California by force or violence
or other unlawful means, nor advocate the support of a foreign government against
the United States in event of hostilities." Id. at 515.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 519-20.
222. Id. at 528-29.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 3 [1983], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss3/4
1983] RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS 463
ceedings, the burden of proof, as well as the burden of persuasion,
rested upon the applicant." The Court held that this procedure, in
effect, declared the applicant presumptively guilty of a crime. 4 The
California procedure not only threatened to deter and penalize pro-
tected expression, but it also attempted by legislative act to deter-
mine whether certain expression was unlawful.2" The Court held that
when the general taxing power is used to deter constitutional rights,
due process requires the expression to remain unencumbered until
the state brings forth proof that such expression is unlawful."'
The present attempt to deny tax exemption to religious schools,
which practice racially restrictive membership beliefs, suffers the same
constitutional defects. "Government may [not] . . . penalize or
discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious
views abhorrent to the authorities . .. nor employ the taxing power
to inhibit the dissemination of particular religious views . ,, ." Yet
the present attempt to deny tax exemption to racially restrictive
religious schools is just such a discriminatory penalty. The proposed
legislation 8 to carry out this plan creates an unconstitutional, religi-
ously based classification for the imposing of penalties and the
withholding of benefits.2" The legislation attempts to classify certain
religious activity, already held lawful,m as unlawful. The Speiser Court
made quite clear that tax exemption could not be conditioned upon
foregoing constitutionally-protected, lawful activity. 3 Since the
Supreme Court has said that racial restrictions by religious schools
are not unlawful,232 then tax exemption cannot be denied them for
this reason. It is unthinkable that religious minorities may be taxed
because they hold views obnoxious and antagonistic to the
government.' If such a concept were accepted, it would be a "com-
plete repudiation of the philosophy of the Bill of Rights."' No religious
minority would be free from government interference if their doctrines
did not happen to meet government approval, particularly if they could
not afford to defend them.
223. Id. at 522.
224. Id. at 523-24.
225. Id. at 525.
226. Id. at 529.
227. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 402.
228. See supra note 17.
229. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. at 639.
230. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 218-21, 224-26 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 230.
233. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
234. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 219 U.S. at 116.
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The present IRS procedures which deny tax exemption to racially
discriminatory religious schools also put the burden of proof and per-
suasion on these schools to defend their constitutional rights.235 In ef-
fect, church schools are being presumed guilty of what only the IRS
has determined to be contrary to "public policy." But under Speiser
the state is required to prove the activity unlawful before tax ex-
emption can be denied in a discriminatory manner.236 Since the
Supreme Court has already said that racial restrictions by religious
schools are not unlawful, the state's burden of proof would seem in-
surmountable. Nevertheless, the IRS is convinced that this activity
is contrary to "public policy", and continues to threaten non-conforming
schools with the penalty of taxation.
By threat of taxation, religious schools are being given a "choice"
to renounce and cease certain religious practices unpopular with the
government or suffer substantial tax liability. Since the power to tax
can be the power to destroy,. 7 the coercive impact upon free exer-
cise rights is overwhelming. This power to control and suppress238
would cause any religious group to pause and steer far clear of any
activity or belief that may displease taxing authorities.' If the govern-
ment can coerce religious schools to admit students outside their faith,
(and thereby compel religious minorities to conform to public policy),
the result will be the establishment of a religion permeated with
government policies, rendering the first amendment meaningless. °
The threat of losing tax exemption will result in the suppression of
religious free exercise.
In summary, the denial of tax-exempt status to racially restric-
tive religious schools would be a crippling burden on free exercise
rights. When the government grants a benefit to a general class, it
cannot withhold that benefit from any member of that class merely
because they refuse to forego a constitutionally protected activity.
In other words, if the state may not directly tax an unpopular religious
practice, it may not do so indirectly by denying that practice tax
exemption.41
235. Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587.
236. See supra notes 222-26 and accompanying text.
237. McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.).
238. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 112, citing Magnano Co. v. Hamilton,
292 U.S. 40, 44-45 (1934).
239. Brief of Amicus Curiae General Conference Mennonite Church in Support
of Petition for a Writ of a Certiorari at 4, Bob Jones University v. United States,
639 F.2d 147.
240. Brief of National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (COLPA)
as Amicus Curiae at 12; Bob Jones University v. United States, 639 F.2d 147.
241. See Thomas Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 101 S. Ct. 1425; Sherbert v. Verner,
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When a free exercise right is involved, only a compelling state
interest is sufficient to warrant the denial of financial benefits such
as unemployment compensation. 42 Similarly, the Court has also held
that the state must prove the questioned activity to be unlawful before
tax exemption could be denied." 3 Therefore, in order to deny tax ex-
emption to religious schools, the compelling state interest must be
sufficient to declare the racially restrictive activities of these schools
unlawful. In light of earlier Supreme Court pronouncements,244 this
burden of proof would be very difficult for the state to meet.
Compelling State Interest
When a burden on sincere religious belief is found, the Court
must determine if a compelling state interest is present. If so, the
Court must then decide whether the means to implement that interest
are the least restrictive alternatives available. 5 Basically, the issue
is whether the state's interest is so paramount to the welfare of society
that free exercise rights must give way to public safety, peace or
order.246
In early cases, religious practice did not receive a great amount
of protection . 4 7 While the right to believe was considered absolute,
religious practices remained subject to "regulation for the protection
of society." '248 However, merely showing a rational basis for such a
regulation was rejected as not adequate to curtail free exercise
rights.249 Instead, the compelling state interest test was developed.25
This two-part test requires the state to demonstrate a compelling in-
terest and that "no alternative forms of regulation would combat such
abuses without infringing [on] First Amendment rights. 251 This test
374 U.S. 398; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513.
242. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. at __, 101 S. Ct. at 1431-33.
243. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. at 529; see supra note 226 and accompanying
text.
244. See supra note 185 and infra note 248 and accompanying text.
245. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 403.
246. Id.; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230.
247. See Drake, supra note 172 at 957-58.
248. See generally Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital, 390 U.S. 598
(1968) (blood transfusion vital to preservation of life); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (safety of minor children on public streets); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination of pupils); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (violation of criminal
polygamy statutes); United States v. Mowat, 582 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1978) (trespass
on government bombing range); Randall v. Wyrick, 441 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Mo. 1977)
(regulation of drugs and narcotics).
249. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 406.
250. Id.; quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
251. Sherbert v. Verner, 274 U.S. at 407.
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places a heavy burden of proof on the state to justify regulation of
religious practices.
The Court has made clear that "only those interests of the
highest order can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise
of religion.""2 ' In Wisconsin v. Yoder,2" a state law required children
to attend school until age sixteen. But members of the Old Order
Amish religion believed education beyond the eighth grade "would
gravely endanger if not destroy" their free exercise rights.2" In balanc-
ing the interests, the Court gave great weight to this potentially
destructive burden on religion.
Weighing the state's interest, the Court admitted that educa-
tion ranked at "the very apex of the function of a State."2 5 But such
broad interests had to be narrowed to the particular facts of the case.
Thus, the question was whether there existed a compelling interest
that Amish children attend two additional years of schooling from ages
14 to 16." The answer was no. Two additional years of school for
Amish children was not essential to the state's interest in preparing
its citizens for participation in society. Nor would accommodating these
particular beliefs "in any other way materially detract from the welfare
of society." '257
Even though a compelling state interest is present, the state may
still be able to achieve that interest by less restrictive alternatives.2"
One possible alternative is exempting religious institutions from
generally applicable laws in order to accommodate religious practices.
Thus, even assuming that the state could prove a compelling interest,
the Court would be required to consider whether a religious exemp-
tion from "public policy" concerning racial discrimination would
"materially detract from the welfare of society."'2
When considering a religious exemption, the Court considers the
impact such an exemption may have on the overall goals of the state's
interest.261 The state's interests, alleged in the present controversy,
252. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
253. Id. at 205.
254. Id. at 219.
255. Id. at 213.
256. Id. at 221-22.
257. Id.
258. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. at __, 101 S. Ct. at 1431; Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 407.
259. Pepper, supra note 39, at 343.
260. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
261. See Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model
of Competing Authorities, 99 YALE L.J. 350 (1980).
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are the elimination of discrimination in education and the elimination
of government subsidies to racial discrimination. Considering that less
than nine percent of elementary and secondary students attend church-
related private schools," and only a handful of those religious schools
are among the minority of religions with racial restrictions, the ex-
emption would apply only to a small fraction of schools. On the other
hand, free exercise rights of religious minorities would be gravely
endangered should they be denied tax exemption for beliefs which
the government finds "offensive". Tax exemption has been traditionally
granted to all religious organizations specifically because they
"uniquely contribute to the pluralism of American society by their
religious activities.""
It must be emphasized, moreover, that tax exemption to religious
schools with racially restrictive practices cannot logically be considered
a tax subsidy for racial discrimination. It is true that the Supreme
Court has ruled that government may not financially support
discrimination through "tangible financial aid" [having a] "significant
tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support" racial discrimination." '
But tax exemptions "constitute mere passive involvement" [and] "not
the affirmative involvement characteristic of outright governmental
subsidy."' 5 By granting a tax exemption the government does not
establish, sponsor, or support any particular religious belief,6 but
merely maintains a historic policy of neutrality which has "prevented
the kind of involvement that would tip the balance toward govern-
ment control of churches or governmental restraint of religious
practice." 6' The Court said few concepts were "more deeply embedded
in the fabric of our National life ... than for government to exercise
at the very least this kind of benevolent neutrality toward churches
and religious exercise generally so long as none was favored ... and
none suffered interference.""26 Therefore, both the historical position
and the neutral nature of religious tax exemption refute the conten-
262. See Note, The IRS, Discrimination, and Religious Schools: Does the Revised
Proposed Revenue Procedure Exact Too High Price?, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW 141, 141
(1980).
263. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring); "Each
group contributes to the diversity of association viewpoint, and enterprise essential
to a vigorous, pluralistic society." Id.
264. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. at 466.
265. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. at 691.
266. Id. at 672-73; "Tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government
does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding
that the church support the state." Id. at 675.
267. Id. at 669-70.
268. Id. at 676-77.
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tion that government is sponsoring or subsidizing any particular
religious beliefs or practices.
Considering the traditional freedom afforded to religious member-
ship practices, it is hard to imagine that they have suddenly trans-
formed into practices that "gravely endanger" paramount interests
in society. 9 The IRS contends that racially restrictive religious beliefs
and practices are offensive to public policy. ° But the suggestion that
minority religious practice can be curtailed as offensive to the major-
ity, is wholly repugnant to the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly condemned such a claim, and has specifically said that
no public policy is offended when constitutional rights are being
exercised. 7' If the government wants to challenge a constitutionally
protected activity as unlawful, it must so do before penalizing it with
loss of generally available benefits.
Another less restrictive alternative, and a way for racially restric-
tive religious practices to be challenged, is an action under section
1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.272 Such an action would be a
direct challenge to the activity in question. As noted earlier" no court
has applied section 1981 to a religious organization whose sincere
religious beliefs mandated some form of racial distinctions. But if
presented with a case involving such beliefs, the Court could settle
the issue without the potential burden, "chilling" effect, and abuse
inherent in a regulatory agency dictating who is violating "public
policy". A §1981 action would also resolve issues concerning the right
of an individual to compel a religious organization to admit him. This
type of action would provide a clear and adversarial context needed
for proper resolution of the issues involved.
CONCLUSION
Denying tax exemption to religious groups practicing unpopular
but lawful racial restrictions is an unconstitutional infringement upon
religious membership practices. The effect of such a discriminatory
penalty is to tax religious minorities who do not conform to
government-approved concepts of social policy. The first amendment,
however, does not and cannot be allowed to permit government to
269. See supra notes 100-101, 250 and accompanying text.
270. Rev. Rul. 75-231, 175-1 C.B. 158.
271. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 694 (1966).
272. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 93-97, 104-109, 122-130 and accompanying text.
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force minority religious groups to conform, to surrender their diver-
sity, or to assimilate the practices and opinions of the government
as a condition on tax exemption. Throughout history, religious
dissenters have struggled to practice and preserve their peculiar
beliefs. It is too late in our constitutional history to assume "that to-
day's majority is 'right' and the [religious dissenters] and others like
them are 'wrong.'""
The power to tax is the power to destroy, and used against
religious minorities, the taxing power will destroy religious free ex-
ercise. If the government grants tax exemption to "approved" religious
practices and denies it to those considered "offensive," the result will
be a chilling effect and coercive pressure to conform to the "approved"
practices dictated by the government. To penalize those minorities
among us who do not "conform" is to destroy two hundred years of
constitutional progress. No matter how paramount the public policy
may be, the preferred and precious nature of the free exercise clause
demands that, "when possible, government policies must be im-
plemented in a manner that does not abridge this basic liberty."275
As one commentator has aptly noted: "mistakes in the area of religious
freedom have far worse consequences for the whole public than
damage to its secular interests arising from a too meticulus protec-
tion of religion." '
Joseph H. Helm, Jr.
274. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 223.
275. See Note, Freedom of Religion as a Defense to a 1981 Action Against a
Racially Discriminatory Private School, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW 107, 119 (1977).
276. E. SMITH, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 325 (1972).
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